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TANDARD MONEY-DEMAND MODELS
began to go off track in 1990, attesting to an
apparent shift in the velocity of M2. This shift
sparked debate about whether M2 velocity is
stable, an important property for an indicator of
monetary policy.1 It also raised questions about
the usefulness ofmoney-demand models for
predicting the effects of Federal Reserve policy.
Ifvelocity shifts in some unforeseeable way,
how is it possible for policyrnakers to exploit
the statistical relationship between M2 and
nominal income to attain their policy goals?
in mid-1993, the Federal Reserve responded
to the velocity shiftby formally downgrading
M2 as an indicator of the state of the economy.
Meanwhile, interest has been rekindled in
defining “money” and searching for alternative
monetary aggregates.
One explanation for the velocity shift is the
increased importance of bond and equity mutual
funds, also called long-term funds, Over the
four-year period from 1990 to 1993, net purchases
of bond and equity mutual funds by investors
In this context, stable is usuallytaken to mean that velocity
is a stationary stochastic process. For some recent evi-
dence on the stability of velocity, see Hallmann and
Anderson (1993).
totaled about $655 billion, compared with about
$400 billion over the 1980s. The surge largely
reflected the yield-seeking behavior of retail
investors. Yields on M2-type assets fell to his-
torically low levels in the early 1990s, while
long-term market interest rates were unusually
high relative to short-term rates, and equity
prices were rising sharply. In this environment,
investors sought higher returns by investing in
bond and equity mutual funds. They may also
have been attracted by the enhanced liquidity
oflong-term mutual fund shares. Most large
mutual fund complexes upgraded their share-
holder services during the late 1980s to permit
investors to write checks against their bond fund
balances, At the same time. banks entered the
mutual fund business as regulations that once
prevented banks from selling mutual funds
virtually evaporated. As a result, investors
could buy and sell mutual fund shares in a
familiar environment: the bank lobby.
Taken together, these two developments—the
recent case ofmissing M2 and the ascendant
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mutual fund industry—raise the issue ofwhether
bond and equity mutual funds ought to be added
to M2. This paper proposes just that, but offers
some caveats. The first section reviews the recent
behavior ofM2 and its deterioration as a predictor
of economic activity. The second section provides
historical background on the mutual fund indus-
try. The third section asks whether bond and
equity mutual funds meet thetests of “moneyness”
usually applied to assets considered for inclusion
in a monetary aggregate. The fourth section
discusses the data needed to construct a theoret-
ically sound monetary aggregate that includes
bond and equity mutual funds. The fifth section
describes how we constructed such an aggregate,
which we will refer to as M2+, The final section
concludes by pointing out some of the drawbacks
of this aggregate.
RECENT BEHAVIOR OF M2
The relationship between M2 and nominal
income was fairly stable for many years before
1990. M2 velocity, which is the ratio of gross
domestic product to the level of M2, fluctuated
around a constant level, Moreover, movements
away from this level were strongly positively
correlated with the opportunity cost of holding
M2, measured as the spread between the yield
on a short-term ‘Treasury security and the
weighted-average return on M2. When short-term
Treasury rates rose, the opportunity cost of
holding M2increased because the rates on the
components ofM2 did not climb as fast as market
rates. As a result, M2 growth would slow relative
to the growth in income, and velocity would rise,
As the rates paid on M2 completed their adjust-
ment to the higher level of market rates, M2’s
opportunity cost would narrow, M2growth would
rise relative to income growth, and velocity would
return toward its trend level. This relationship
meant that M2 growth could serve as a guidepost
to current (but as yet unknown) income growth.
In mid-1990, however, the velocity of M2 rose
substantially above its long-run average, despite
a very considerable drop in the opportunity cost
of holding M2 (Figure 1). At the same time,
conventional demand equations for M2, which
are statistical representations of the relationship
between money and variables such as interest
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rates and income, beganto go offtrack (Figure 2).
Between the first quarter of 1990 and the fourth
quarter of 1993, the Board staff’s quarterly model
of M2 demand overpredicted growth by an average
of 2.5 percentage points per quarter—misesti-
mates that cumulated to nearly $380 billion by
the end of 1993.2
Several alternative hypotheses have been
advanced to explain the missing M2. Duca
(1993a) postulated that the resolution of thrifts
by the Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC) may
have been a factor. In short, he argued that
deposit rates were reset by depository institu-
tions that acquired the deposits of resolved
thrifts. More often than not, the new deposit
rates would be lower—typically much lower—
than the rates that thrift investors had enjoyed
earlier. This “sticker shock” led thrift deposi-
tors to reassess their portfolios in ways not cap-
tured by conventional money-demand models.
Duca’s explanation is an important one for 1990
and 1991, but cannot explain the subsequent
weakness in M2 because RTC funding and, thus,
resolution activity dried up in 1992. Wenninger
and Partlan (1992) focused on the weakness in
small time deposits. They noted that the phasing
out of Regulation Q (which limited the rates banks
could pay on deposits) encouraged banks to think
ofsmall time deposits as managed liabilities.
Consequently, banks, which faced weak credit
demand, were rather unaggressive bidders for
small CDs. The authors also noted that, on the
demand side, consumers may havebeen surprised
by the substantial decline in deposit rates, and
they therefore sought the higher returns available
on mutual fund investments. Other explanations
advanced in the press and elsewhere attributed
the weakness in M2 to a number of sources: the
credit crunch; rising deposit insurance premiums;
the imposition of new, higher capital standards
for depositories; the downsizing of consumer
balance sheets (which was accomplished by
using M2 balances to pay off debt); the unusual
2 This model isdescribed in Moore, Porter and Small (1990).
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steepness of the yield curve; and, finally, the
especially strong flows into bond and equity
mutual funds over the 1991-93 period.
A common threadbinds these stories: They
highlight some facet of household demand for
money not captured in conventional money-
demand models. For instance, if the demand
for money by households is influenced by returns
on capital market instruments, then this effect
would be reflected as an error in conventional
money-demand models, because such models
usually depend only on the spread between the
yield on a short-term Treasury security and the
weighted-average rate paid on M2balances,
Similarly, to the extent that rising deposit insur-
ance premiums were not accurately reflected in
reported deposit rates, conventional models
could experience significant forecast errors.
The incompleteness of conventional
money-demand models sparked attempts to
revamp such models. Feinman and Porter (1992)
augmented the Board staff’s model ofthe demand
for M2. Rather than defining the opportunity cost
of M2 as the spread between a short-term Treasury
rate and the rate ofreturn on M2 balances, they
estimated the opportunity cost of holding M2
balances. Their model chose the opportunity
cost by selecting among rates of return on M2-type
balances and competing assets.3 In contrast to
conventional models, Feinman and Porter found
that yields on longer-term Treasury instruments
and consumer debt were significant factors in
determining money demand. A steep yield
curve tended to dampen money growth and
helped lo explain weak M2growth. Although
the Feinman-Porter model achieved some success
in predicting M2 growth out-of-sample, the model
had difticulty beginning in mid-1993, when
long-term interest rates fell sharply. In part, this
problem may have stemmed from an asymmetric
response of investors to changes in the slope of
the yield curve, If the yield curve flattens
because long-term interest rates have declined,
investors in mutual funds may enjoy temporary
capital gains, thus depressing their appetites for
M2 balances. In contrast, ifthe yield curve flattens
because short-term rates have risen, investors
would garner no capital gains (and might even
confront capital losses on short-term securities),
and they would see an erosion of the yield
advantage ofmutual funds over M2-type balances.
However, the Feinman-Porter model treats the
two kinds of flattening the same.
A different approach advocated by Hendry
and Ericsson (1990) for the United Kingdom,
and recently employed by the Board staff, is
to introduce an “error-learning” term into the
conventional M2 demand equation. The error-
learning term attempts to capture changes in
preferences as investors “learn” about mutual
funds and their potentially higher yields.
Nonetheless, as suggested by Higgins (1992),
ifthe slowdown in M2 was to some extent a
permanent phenomenon related to restructuring
(both regulatory and technical) in the financial
industry, then error-learning models might even-
tually go offtrack as well. Indeed, this appears to
be the case, as the Board’s error-learning model
has recently been overpredicting money growth.
The standard model has been modified by
adding other variables as well, Carlson and
Byrne (1992) and Duca (1993a) both included
variables that accounted for the impact of thrift
closings. Duca (1993b) further modified the
model by changing the dependent variable to
be M2 plus various measures ofhouseholds’
holdings of bond mutual funds. He found that
both the assets ofbond mutual funds and RTC
activity helped explain the missing M2.
Instead of reworking conventional money-
demand models, many economists have suggested
abandoning M2 as an aggregate and replacing
it with another, more predictable (they hope)
aggregate. The search for a replacement to M2
has given rise to a cottage industry ofconstructing
and testing alternative aggregates. Among the
proposed successors to M2 are Ml, M1A, liquid
M2 (M2 less small time deposits), MZM (M2 less
small time deposits plus assets of institution-only
money market mutual funds), M2E (M2 plus assets
of institution-only money funds), household M2
The rates of return included on M2-type balances were for
other checkable deposits, savings accounts (including
MMDAs), smalltime deposits with original maturities of
six months, small time deposits with original maturities
oftwo-and-a-half years or over, and the yield on money
marketmutual funds, Yields on competing instruments
included those for three-month Treasury bills, five-year
Treasury notes, 30-year Treasury bonds and the
48-month auto loan rate.
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(M2 less demand deposits, and overnight RPs
and Eurodollars), M2BF (M2 plus bond mutual
funds) and, most recently, M2-i- (M2 plus
household holdings of bond and equity
mnutual funds).4
To date, none of these proposed aggregates
has been particularly well-received because all
are plaguedby theoretical or empirical difficulties.
With respect to Ml and MIA, recent history
clearly demonstrates that they are too highly
interest elastic to serve as a useful indicator
of income growth. Liquid M2, considered by
Wenninger and Partlan (1992), among others,
seems appealing on the theoretical grounds
that small CDs are neither veryliquid nor trans-
action balances; liquid M2, however, suffers
from the same interest-elasticity problem as Ml.
Moreover, the velocity of liquid M2 has been
less predictable than that of M2 itself. Poole’s
proposed aggregate, MZM, is subject to the same
criticism and would additionally include a com-
ponent (institution-only money funds) that is
extremely sensitive to money market pressures
and thus is highly volatile. Institutional investors
will make large adjustments in their holdings of
money funds in response to very small differen-
tials between market rates and those on money
funds. This sensitivity was demonstrated in
February 1994, when nearly $16 billion flowed
out of institution-only money funds following a
0.25 percentage point increase in the federal
funds rate.
M2BF and M2+ are not trouble-free, either on
empirical or theoretical grounds. Eachattempts
to internalize some ofthe observed substitution
between M2 and long-term mutual funds, These
aggregates therefore should have a more stable
relationship to nominal income than M2 alone.
The empirical evidence, however, suggests that
these aggregates may not he much more stable
than M2. For instance, Orphanides, Reid and
Small (1994) point out that the velocity ofM2+,
although perhaps more predictable than that of
M2, would have led to substantial overpredictions
of GDP growth during the past fewyears, just
like M2 (indeed, the velocity of M2÷ grew quite
rapidly in early 1994). In part, these overpredic-
tions may not stem from the definition of the
augmented aggregate but rather from an inappro-
priate measuring of the opportunity cost variable.
The authors use the slope of the yield curve as a
proxy for the yield advantage of holding bond and
equity funds; however, there is no necessary reason
why the yield on long-term bonds should be a
good proxy for the return on equities. Moreover,
one can argue that if the expectations hypothesis
is true, the yield on short-termTreasury securities
should adequately measure the opportunity cost.5
Difficult issues arise on the theoretical side
as well. For instance, should we add just bond
funds to M2, or should equity funds be included
as well? Duca (1993) focused mainly on bond
funds on the grounds that equity funds carry
substantial principal risk and therefore are less
substitutable for M2balances. The liquidity of
equity funds, however, suggests that there may
be some benefit to including these funds in an
augmented aggregate. A thornier issue is the
treatment of capital gains. Orphanides, Reid
and Small (1994) note that excluding capital
gains from net assets could lead to substantial
misestimates of potential balances and introduce
an element of arbitrariness into measuring the
aggregates, but including capital gains may permit
changes in interest rates or equity prices tointro-
duce excessive volatility into the aggregate. As
a consequence, the M2+ aggregate, although it
has the advantage ofinternalizing portfolio shifts
between mutual funds and M2, will he quite
sensitive to movements in bond amid equity prices.
This problemn poses difficulties, but the difficulties
may be somewhat less severe than the problems
affecting the alternative aggregates discussed
earlier. Nonetheless, in order to better interpret
the movements in M2+, one must track capital
gains and losses.
In this paper, we focus on issues related to
the construction of M2+. These issues include
Monetary economists in otherindustrialized countries have
grappled with similar problems astheir official monetary
aggregates have succumbed to financial innovation and
deregulation. In Canada, McPhail (1993) proposed an M2+
aggregate consisting of M2 balances plus savings bonds
and short-term Treasury securities. Arestis and others
(1993) discussed the difficulties faced by the Bank of
England in defining and controlling monetary aggregates
during the 1980s. They concluded that “trying to target the
growth rate of broad monetary aggregates in the UK...has
alwaysbeen problematic because of the weak and some-
times perverse relationships between the level ot absolute
rates and the relative rates which form the key to [money
targetingl.’ To our knowledge, though, economists in the
United States were the first to propose incorporating bond
and equity mutual funds into a monetary aggregate.
This point is a matter of debate. For a contrary view, see
Feinman and Porter (1992).
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the following: Should we exclude from M2+
the assets of mutual funds devoted to retirement
accounts? Should we exclude the liquid assets
held by mutual funds on the grounds that such
assets are “money” and have already been
counted in M2? Should we exclude the assets
ofinternational funds, whose underlying invest-
ments are denominated in currencies other than
dollars and thus may not reflect purchasing power
within the United States? More pragmatically,
do the data exist to make such adjustments?
RECENT HISTORY OF THE’ MUTUAL
FUND INDUSTRY
Net assets of stock and bond mutual funds
were nearly $1.5 trillion at the end of 1993,
about 24 times higher than in 1980 (Figure 3).
Most of this dramatic growth reflected heavy
purchases of fund shares by investors, as
opposed to revaluations of fund investments,
During the 1980s, net purchases ofbond and
equity mutual fimds averaged $54 billion per year.
The upswing during the 1980s was prompted,
in part, by rising stock and bond prices. With
incomes and wealth rising, investors were inter-
ested in taking advantage of potential gains in
equity and bond markets, and mutual funds
permitted smallinvestors to invest in a diversified
portfolio at low cost.°Investor interest may also
have been spurred between 1982 and 1986 by
the incentives to invest in individual retirement
accounts (IRA) and Keogh accounts.7
The popularity of bond and equity mutual
funds soared in the early 1990s. Two record
years were reported in 1992 and 1993, when
investors made net purchases of$202 billion
and $266 billion, respectively (Figure 4). The
increased pace of purchases stemmed, in large
part, from the low-interest rate environment and
the steepness of the yield curve, In early 1989,
A mutual fund is a type of investment company. It sells
shares representing an interest in a pool of securities. The
minimum initial investment for many long-term funds is
around $2,500, in contrast to, say, the $10,000 minimum
investment needed to purchase a Treasury bill. For a more
complete discussion of recent trends in the mutual fund
industry, see Mack (1993).
IRAs and Keogh accounts are two types oftax-sheltered
accounts that are used to save for retirement.
1980818283848586878889909192931994
FEDERAL RESERVE SANK OF ST. LOUIS1-3
Figure 4
Net Flows into Long-Term Bond and Equity Mutual Funds
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the yield curve was essentially flat. Between
March 1989 and December 1993, the yield on
three-month Treasury bills fell by about 6 per-
centage points to around 3 percent, while the
yield on 30-year bonds fell by 3 percentage
points to about 6,25 percent (Figure 5). At the
same time, equity prices were rising. Over the
24 months from January 1992 to December 1993,
the stock market advanced just over 20 percent.
In this rate environment, investors sought the
higher returns available in long-term mutual
funds. Equity funds were also apparently boosted
by households substituting out of direct purchases
ofequities. The flow-of-funds accounts show
that households’ direct holdings of equities fell
$21 billion in 1993, in contrast with the $140
billion of inflows into equity mutual funds.
Faced with a loss of deposits to mutual
funds, many banks began entering the mutual
fund business in the late 1980s. Since 1989,
the assets ofbank-related mutual funds have
increased tremendously, relative to the total
assets of the mutual fund industry. As shown in
the top panel of Table 1, long-termbank-related
mutual funds accounted for only about 2 percent
oftotal assets of long-term funds in 1989, but this
figure had more than tripled by mid-1994. As
the bottom panel of Table I shows, the number
of long-term funds offered by banks climbed
even faster, experiencing more than a fivefold
increase from 1989 to mid-1994. In contrast,
for the industry as a whole, the number of long-
term funds less than doubled over the same
period (from 2,242 funds to 3,894 funds). As a
result, thebanking sector created nearly 60 per-
cent of all new long-term funds over this period.
The watershed year for bank-related long-term
funds was 1992, when the average number of
funds sold per bank jumped sharply. In that
year, Nationsbank started 55 new long-term
funds, and many other banks plunged into
the business as well.
ARE MUTUAL FUND SHARES MONEY?
Economists have typically asked two questions
when designing monetary aggregates: Dothe assets
in question serve as a transaction balance or a
medium of exchange, and is the asset readily
convertible into a transaction balance? For our
purposes, we consider to what extent shares held
in long-term mutual funds may be used as payment
for goods, services or other assets. We also explore
whether individuals consider fund shares to be
readily convertible into transaction balances.
Investments in bond and equity mutual
funds cannot generally be used as a medium
of exchange or as a transaction balance. Some
bond funds are exceptions. Bond funds some-
times offer a check-writing option that permits
investors to make purchases by writing a check
directly against their bond fund assets, Thus,
there is good reason to consider sonic portion
ofthe assets ofbond funds to he transaction
balances. Indeed, check writing is nearly uni-
versal among money market mutual funds,
whose assets are included in M2. On the other
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hand, although both money market funds and
bond funds typically impose minimum dollar
amounts on checks written against them (often
$500), the check-writing feature ofbond funds
is usually less flexible, because they sometimes
impose maximum dollar amounts (often 50 per-
cent of an investor’s total bond fund assets).°
Irrespective of the check-writing features they
offer,mutual funds can he quite liquid. Investors
can usually redeem assets by telephone and have
the proceeds wired to their checking or money
market fund the same day.9 Moreover, the vast
majority of fund complexes (a group of funds
managed by the same advisor) routinely offer
exchange privileges at nominal cost or no cost.
Exchange privileges allow investors to shift assets
betweenlong-term funds andmoney market funds
(or other long-term funds) within their complex.
Thus, a telephone call again allows fund investors
to shift in and out of M2-type accounts (that is,
retail money market mutual funds). Figure 6
shows the cumulative sum of net exchanges out
of money market funds into long-term funds for
the years 1989 to 1993. This sum rose during the
1990-93 period, when the M2 forecasting equation
went off track. Although the cumulative sum is
not particularly large, relative to the $380 billion
of missing M2, it does suggest that there is a
quantitatively important, and technologically
direct, substitution between a component of M2
and long-term mutual funds. One factor that
tempers this argument is that some mutual funds
charge exit fees (hack-end loads). By raising
transaction costs, back-end loads reduce substi-
tutability between long-term mutual funds and
M2 balances.
Another way to decide whether an asset is
“money” is to look at its turnover rate, measured
as total withdrawals divided by outstanding
balances. Spindt (1985) argued that transaction
accounts have high turnover rates; therefore, the
higher the transaction balance, the greater the
degree of “moneyness.” Figure 7 shows turnover
rates for some of the components of M2, along
with turnover rates for equity and bond funds.
Turnover rates for checkable deposits are quite
high, reflecting their use as the primary transaction
account for most households. Turnover rates
on savings accounts and money market mutual
funds are somewhat lower. Turnover ratios on
long-term funds are quite low, an indication that
individuals regard these accounts mainly as sav-
ings vehicles, rather than transaction balances.
Figure 7 lacks one important series: the turnover
ratio for small time deposits. Unfortunately, the
Federal Reserve does not collect this information.
Staff at the Federal Reserve Board, however, have
estimated that the turnover ratio for small time
deposits is on the order to 1 percent to 1.5 percent
at an annual rate, which is reasonably close to
the estimated turnover ratio for long-term funds.
In summary, there are some reasons tothink
ofthe assets of bond and equity mutual funds as
“money,” or at least close substitutes for money.
Although the reasons for believing mutual fund
assets tobe money are not overwhelmingly strong,
they are about as favorable as the case for calling
small time deposits money. Both small time
deposits and long-term mutual fund assets are
mainly savings balances, as opposed to transaction
balances. Both have a high degree of substi-
tutability (or potential substitutability) with other
kinds of M2 balances. In addition, investors in
these instruments may face some penalty for
withdrawing their balances.
DESIRED DATA
The current monetary aggregates measure the
public’s holdings of money first by summing the
total outstanding amounts of instruments deemed
to be money and then subtracting money holdings
ofthe U.S. government, foreign governments,
depository institutions, and money market mutual
funds. (Table 2 shows the construction of M2,)
The current aggregates also attempt to distinguish
between individual (retail) and institutional
holdings of money market mutual funds. This
distinction is based on the belief that individuals’
holdings of money market mutual funds are more
closely related toconsumption and income than
are institutions’ holdings, which are more tightly
linked to financialmarket conditions. In practice,
however, making such a distinction is difficult
because data on money funds are available only
by type of fund, not bytype of holder. Conse-
quently, the distinction between retail and
institutional money funds is not clear cut: Funds
deemed to he institution-only funds accept
investments from individuals as long as those
individuals meet the sizable minimum investment
Maximums are imposed to prevent an investor from incur-
ring an overdraft if bond prices fellsharply on the day that
the check clears.
° Proceeds can also be mailed by check, but this option would
reduce liquidity relative to the wire transfer option.
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requirements, and institutions can invest in
retail funds.1°
The guiding principle we followed when
constructing M2+ was to parallel the current
construction ofM2. The data needed to addbond
and equity mutual funds to M2 are in many ways
similar to those that were needed to incorporate
money market mutual funds into M2. Wemust
be able to measure the total net assets of long-term
mutual funds and, for netting purposes, the
monetary investments of such funds, as well
as balances held by institutions or invested in
retirement accounts. Table 3 summarizes the
series necessary for the construction of M2+.
The first requirement for building M2+ is an
accurate measure of total net assets of bond and
equity mutual funds. Total net assets of a mutual
fund are simply its total assets—essentially the
market value of its securities portfolio—less its
total liabilities, which include such items as
accounts payable (for investments purchased or
shares redeemed), accrued management fees,
and other accrued expensesH We included
reinvested dividends and capital gains in order
to treat these items like interest credited on
deposits, which is included in M2.
The second requirement is to distinguish
hetween mutual fund holdings of individual
and institutional investors. In order to parallel
the current treatment ofmoney market mutual
funds, we would split bond and equity mutual
funds into retail and institution-only funds; we
cannot do so, however, because long-term funds
typically accept investments from both individual
and institutional investors, Therefore, we need
data on holdings of long-term mutual funds by
type of investor, with individual holdings
appearing inM2÷.
Bond and equity mutual funds invest in
instruments included in the monetary aggregates.
If the total net assets of these funds were simply
added to M2, the hinds’ holdings of monetary
instruments would he counted twice because
their holdings already would be included in the
outstanding amounts of monetary instruments,
such as overnight RPs with banks. To avoid this
le 2
























douhle counting, monetan inve tments of long-
term funds houl he exclrded f om M2+, just
as hold ng ofmo chit ii str mm~ sl\ ione
funds and dupo itor institutions arc ciii led
from M2. Therefore, we need Data on hour and
equit\ und holdings ofoverrughi Eurodol ars
and oiernight RP. m ith de1 o tor ‘nstitutions.
Monover the dat ideall imould allon to
apportion these so-cdllcd netting itcm between
those due to retail investors and thosc due to
institutional investor.
Finally, paralleling the current agg egates
req nrc, us to exclude from the M2+ aggregate
IRA and Keogh balance. held as bond and eqnit~
~° Institution-only money funds are funds that impose high min-
imum balances on shareholders. These minimums—usually
950,000—are prohibitively high for the great majority of retail
customers.
The value of a share in a long-term fund is calculated each
day by dividing the total net assets of the fund by the num-
ber of shares outstanding.
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mutual fund shares, IRA/Keogh accounts are
savings vehicles and typically are not used for
transaction purposes. Indeed, these accounts
are extremely illiquidbecause federal law imposes
stiffpenalties for withdrawals before retirement,
Of course, for individuals of retirement age (59-
and-a-half or older), IRA/Keogh balances are
liquid. As a practical matter, though, it would
be nearly impossible to estimate the percentage
of IRA/Keogh balances that might he considered
liquid. As a result, instead of making an arbitrary
assumption about the proportion of IRA/Keogh
balances that are licjuid, M2simply excludes all
IRA/Keogh balances held in deposit accounts
and money market funds, and we follow that
approach for M2+ by removing balances held in
IRA/Keogh accounts from the measure of total
net assets of long-term funds.
ACTUAL CONSTRIJCTION OF M2÷
Not all of the desired data set forth in the
previous section are available. This section
therefore discusses data availability and gives
the technical details on how the augmented
aggregate M2+ was constructed. (Table 4
provides a summary.)
The Investment Company Institute (Id) is
a prominent source of mutual fund data. It is
funded by contributions from its members, which
comprise the vast majority of investment compa-
nies. On behalfof the Federal Reserve, ICI has
been collecting data on money funds for over 12
years, including data on their assets, their invest-
ments and their IRA/Keogh balances. These
series are used in the construction of M2, M3
and L. We have used ICI’s data on long-term
funds to construct M2+.
Net Asset Data
Monthly data on the total net assets of bond
and equity mutual funds are drawn from ICI’s
Trends in Mutual Fund Activity. i’his release
publishes (with a lag of about one month) data on
total net assets held by long-term funds measured
as of month-end, In 1993, ICI collected data from
over 3,000 long-term funds. From the Trends
releases, we compiled a monthly series on the
total net assets of bond and equity mutual funds
hack to 1959.
We deviated from our guiding principle of
constructing M2+ like M2 in only one area: net
assets ofglobal amid international mutual funds.
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denominated in foreign currencies, as well as
those denominated in dollars, Although M2
excludes deposits denominated in foreign cur-
rencies, we incorporated the assets ofthese types
of funds in M2+. This treatment seems justified
by the following considerations, First, doing so
permits M2+ to internalize substitutions between
non-dollar-denominated and dollar-deuominat-
ed funds. Second, the foreign currency deposits
netted from M2 have been quite small, amounting
to only a fewbillion dollars, Moreover, these
assets are thought to be held by institutions,
mainly for clearing purposes. Thus, the netting
of these assets has little impact on the monetary
aggregates, and doing so skirts a difficult theo-
retical issue: Arenon-dollar-denominated
assets money in the United States? This issue
cannot be swept aside when considering long-
term mutual funds. The assets of international
mutual funds are thought to beheld mainly by
retail investors and are growing rapidly.
Although
the underlying investments of these funds are
denominated in foreign currencies, these funds’
net asset values (share prices) are reported in
dollars and thus may be viewed by retail
investors as liquid investments that are highly
substitutable for assets in M2or for other kinds
ofmutual funds whose underlying investments
are denominated in dollars. Finally, because of
data limitations, it would be very difficult to
extract only the dollar-denominated holdings
ofthese funds for inclusion in M2+.
Institutional Holdings
In orderto apportion the total net assets of
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holdings on a monthly basis. Nonetheless,
Table 4
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long-term mutual funds between retail and insti-
tutional holdings, we made use of the ICI’s survey
of institutional holdings of long-term mutual
funds. IC! first surveyed such holdings in 1954
and did so biennially until 1980. Since that time,
its survey has been conducted annually. In the
survey, mutual funds report the percent of their
assets held by various institutions on the last
day of the calendar year. Among the largest
institutional holders are fiduciaries (bank trust
departments) and retirement plans. The data are
disaggregated enough to permit us to apportion
institutional holdings of mutual funds between
long-term funds and money market funds for
survey dates back to 1974. For earlier years, we
have assumed that the assets of money market
mutual funds were zero;thus, any institutional
holdings in these years are allocated to long-
term funds.
We had to make several adjustments to the raw
data in order to derive a monthly series on insti-
tutional holdings, First, we adjusted for the
changes in the format of ICI’s survey by making
several ad hoc adjustments to remove the breaks
in the series. Second, we converted the break-
adjusted series into monthly observations. We
did soby linearly interpolating between surveys
the end-of-year ratio of institutional assets to total
net assets of long-term funds. Third, we multi-
plied each of the resulting monthly ratios by
total net assets in the corresponding month to
derive the series on institutional holdings. We
could then construct a series on retail holdings
of long-term mutual funds by subtracting our
institutional series from total net assets. The
resulting series therefore may be subject to con-
siderable month-to-month errorbecause of the
assumptions required to estimate institutional
analyses of the long-run behavior of M2+ likely
would not be impaired much because, by con-
struction, the interpolated series is tied to ICI’s
year-end observations.
Liquid Iuvestmen-is
The current monetary aggregates, M2 and M3,
are constructed to avoid double-counting of assets.
For example, the RP and Eurodollar investments
ofmoney marketmutual funds are excluded from
the monetary aggregates to avoid counting them
twice: once inthe money fund component of M2,
and again in the RP and Eurodollar components
of M2. To avoid double-counting when con-
structing M2+, we needed data on long-term
mutual fund holdings of M2 instruments, such as
overnight RPs and Eurodollars. Most bond and
equity mutual funds hold a portion of their port-
folios in liquid investments to meet investors’
demands for share redemption. IC! has collected
monthly data on the total liquid investments of
long-term funds since 1960, with a detailed break-
down of such investments into short-term
Treasury securities, short-term municipal secu-
rities, and “cash and other receivables” beginning
in 1991. Nonetheless, this breakdown is still too
aggregated for our purposes. Rather than arbitrarily
createa series on long-term mutual funds holdings
of M2-type assets, which would consist principally
of overnight RPs and Eurodollars, we chose to
make no adjustment at all. Our view was that these
holdings would be a relatively small portion of
M2+ and that any assumption we might make to
removethem could well introduce greater error into
M2+ than that caused by double-counting them.
IRA/Keogh Assets
Retirement account balances are thought to be
too illiquid to be used as transaction balances.
Consequently, the monetary aggregates exclude
balances in IRA and Keogh accounts. To parallel
this treatment, we used ICI’s data on IRA/Keogh
balances in long-term mutual funds to exclude
such holdings from M2÷.Month-end data on the
assets ofbond and equity mutual funds that are
held in IRA and Keogh accounts balances begin in
January 1983. Data for earlier periods are avail-
able either quarterly or annually.’2 For years prior
to 1983, we constructed monthly observations on
12 Onlyyear-end figures on these assets are available for
1981 and 1982. Quarter-end figures are available for IRA
accounts from 1975 to 1980 and from 1964 to 1980 for
Keogh accounts. Earlier data for IRA accounts are not avail-
able, but balances in these accounts were essentially nil
before 1977.
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IRA/Keogh balances of long-term fundsby linearly
interpolating the ratio of IRA/Keogh assets to total
net assets of long-term frmds between the quarterly
or annual observations, We then multiplied this
interpolated ratio by the total net assets of long-
term funds for the corresponding month.”
Deriving Monthly Averages
ICI’s long-term mutual fund data are month-
end observations. M2 is a monthly average
derived from either daily or weekly data,
depending on the component. In order to add the
mutual fund data to M2, items related to mutual
funds had to he converted to a month-average
basis. We approximated monthly averages for
ICI’s data by taking two-month moving averages
of the month-end figures for total net assets,
institutional holdings and IRA/Keogh balances.
Seasonal Adjustment
As Figure 8 shows, some of the components
of the monetary aggregates have large seasonal
regularities. Seasonality in the aggregates arises
primarily from their transaction nature; for
instance, currency demand is seasonally high
in December because of Christmas shopping.
Tax payments, other holidays and interest cred-
iting also occur seasonally. Ifthe monetary
aggregates were not adjusted for seasonal varia-
tion, it would be hard to discern changes in
money demand related to movements in interest
rates and income. Because it is these latter effects
that are of primary interest to policymakers,
seasonal adjustment of the monetary aggregates
is imperative.
As a rule, seasonality is strongest within the
components ofMl and less so for those in non-
Mi M2 because the components of non-Mi M2
are not used as extensively as Ml for transaction
purposes (Figure 9). With respect to long-term
mutual fund assets, which we have suggested may
be driven less by transaction motives than by
savings motives, one might expect to find weak,
or nonexistent, seasonality. Ifso, it would obviate
the need for us to seasonally adjust such assets
before adding them to M2. Figure 10 indicates
that there is indeed little apparent seasonality
in the assets of mutual funds,
Nevertheless, our guiding principle of paral-
leling the current construction of M2 dictates
that mutual fund assets should be seasonally
adjusted before adding them to M2. Accordingly,
we used the following seasonal adjustment pro-
cedure. We constructed a not-seasonally adjusted
(NSA) measure of household holdings ofmutual
fund assets, called the “plus” portion ofM2+, as
shown in Table 4. This component is the assets
of bond and equity funds less institutional hold-
ings and IRA/Keogh balances. The “plus” portion
is then seasonally adjusted using Census X-ii,
assi.uning multiplicative seasonality.14 Seasonally
adjusted M2+ is constructed by adding the sea-
sonally adjusted “plus” portion to seasonally
adjusted M2. A comparison ofM2 and M2+ is
shown in Figure 11, and Appendix 1 provides
estimates of M2+ for recent years.’5
CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper has detailed construction ofan
alternative monetary aggregatethat adds house-
hold holdings of bond and equity mutual funds
to M2. This aggregatehas the advantage of
internalizing some of the observed substitution
between long-term mutual funds and M2 bal-
ances. The empirical evidence discussed by
Orphanides, Reid and Small (1994) suggests
that M2+ does have some advantages over M2,
in that its velocity appears to have been more
“sensible” overthe past few years. Consequently,
the predictability ofGDP is improved. A major
drawback of this aggregate, however, is that it is
very sensitive to movements in bond and equity
prices. For example, in early 1994, the velocity
of M2+ rose sharply, in large part reflecting
declines in hond and equity prices, and it remains
to he seen whether the velocity of M2+ will return
to its trend level. In fact, the only sure test of a
monetary aggregate is thetest of time. Iffinancial
“ There are many othertypes of retirement vehicles, such as
employer-sponsored retirement plans and annuities; however,
only IRA/Keogh balances are subtracted from M2. The
measure of M2+ that weconstructed did not includebalances
in retirement accounts other than IRA and Keogh accounts
because these accounts are included in Cl’s measure of
institutional holdings. Thus, subtracting institutional holdings
from total net assets removes these balances from M2+.
Strictly speaking, we have again deviated from our practice
of paralleling the construction of M2, but we do not feel that
the deviation impairs the usefulness of the M2+ aggregate.
14 This algorithm is essentially the same one used to seasonally
adjust the current monetary aggregates. For a complete
description of that algorithm, see Farley and O’Brien (1987).
“The reader is referred to Orphanides, Reid and Small (1994)
for a discussion of the empirical properties of M2÷.
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Appendix I
M2 and M2 Plus Bond and Stock Mutual Funds (M2+)
Levels
(billions of $) Growth rates
M2 M2+ M2 M2÷ Difference
(1) (2) (3) (4) (4)—(3)
Monthly
1993 1 $3502.8 $4046.7 -2.1 3.5 -5.6
1993 2 3494.2 4063.6 -2.9 5.0 -7.9
1993 3 3494.8 4066.2 .2 .7 -.5
1993 4 3498 4072.8 1.0 1.9 -.8
1993 5 3521.9 4108.1 8.1 10.4 -2.2
1993 6 3528.7 4128.5 2.3 5.9 -3.6
1993 7 3533.7 4148.3 1.6 5.7 -4.0
1993 8 3536 4169.2 .7 6.0 -5.2
1993 9 3544.2 4201.8 2.7 9.3 -6.6
1993 10 3547.8 4225.6 1.2 6.8 -5.5
1993 11 3560.1 4252.3 4.1 7.5 -3.4
1993 12 3567.6 4265.1 2.5 3.6 -1.0
1994 1 3572.8 4278.9 1.7 3.8 -2.1
1994 2 3568.9 4280 -1.2 .3 -1.6
1994 3 3582.9 4276.7 4.6 -.9 5.6
1994 4 3589.9 4277.1 2.3 .1 2.2
1994 5 3590.9 4278 .3 .2 .0
1994 6 3581.3 4263.8 -3.1 -3.9 .7
Quarterly
1991 1 3380.6 3702.5 3.8 5.5 -1.7
1991 2 3418.2 3765.8 4.4 6.8 -2.3
1991 3 3427.1 3796.3 1.0 3.2 -2.1
1991 4 3444.3 3851.2 2.0 5.7 -3.7
1992 1 3478 3912.6 3.9 6.3 -2.4
1992 2 3480.6 3935.7 .2 2.3 -2.0
1992 3 3488.9 3974 .9 3.8 -2.9
1992 4 3509 4022 2.3 4.8 -2.5
1993 1 3497.3 4058.8 1.3 3.6 -5.0
1993 2 3516.2 4103.1 2.1 4.3 -2.2
1993 3 3538 4173.1 2.4 6.8 -4.3
1993 4 3558.5 4247.7 2.3 7.1 -4.8
1994 1 3574.9 4278.5 1.8 2.9 -1.0
1994 2 3587.4 4273 1.3 -.5 1.9
Annual (Q4/Q4)
1987 2916.6 3197.4 4.3 4.9 -.6
1988 3070.6 3353.9 5.2 4.8 .3
1989 3219.2 3535.3 4.8 5.4 -.5
1990 3348.5 3651.6 4.0 3.2 .7
1991 3444.3 3851.2 2.8 5.4 -2.6
1992 3509 4022 1.8 4.4 -2.5
1993 3558.5 4247.7 1.4 5.6 -4.2
1 The market value of mutual funds balances added to M2 excludes balances in IRA/Keogh accounts and institutional holdings of
long-term mutual funds. Data are seasonally adjusted.
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Levels ofthe Augmented Aggregate M2+
was constructed
Month M2+ M2 Month
299.3 286.6 1964 1
300.5 287.7 1964 2
302.0 289.0 1964 3
303.4 290.1 1964 4
305.9 292.2 1964 5
307.8 293.9 1964 6
309.6 295.3 1964 7
310.8 296.4 1964 8
310.7 296.4 1964 9
310.9 296.5 1964 10
311.5 297.1 1964 11
312.1 297.7 1964 12
312,4 298.2 1965 I
312.4 298.5 1965 2
313.2 299.2 1965 3
314.1 300.0 1965 4
315.2 300.9 1965 5
316.9 302.1 1965 6
319.2 304.2 1965 7
321.9 306.8 1965 8
323.3 308.2 1965 9
324.6 309.5 1965 10
326.1 311.0 1965 11
327.7 312.3 1965 12
330.3 314.1 1966 1
333.5 316.6 1966 2
335.6 318.1 1966 3
337.9 319.9 1966 4
340.8 322.2 1966 5
342.9 324.1 1966 6
344.7 325.6 1966 7
347.1 327.5 1966 8
349.1 329.3 1966 9
351.5 331.2 1966 10
354.3 333.4 1966 11
356.4 335.4 1966 12
M2+ M2 Month
419.2 395.4 1969 1
421.6 397.6 1969 2
424.0 399.5 1969 3
426.3 401.7 1969 4
429.0 404.2 1969 5
432.2 406.8 1969 6
436.4 410.1 1969 7
439.7 413.3 1969 8
443.1 416.5 1969 9
446.1 419.2 1969 10
448.9 422.2 1969 11
451.4 424.7 1969 12
454.7 427.8 1970 1
457.8 430.4 1970 2
460.5 433.0 1970 3
463.1 435.5 1970 4
465.0 437.0 1970 5
467.5 439.8 1970 6
470.7 442.8 1970 7
474.3 445.6 1970 8
478.6 449.1 1970 9
483.1 452.7 1970 10
486.8 455.9 1970 11
490.7 459.3 1970 12
494.2 462.3 1971 1
496.6 464.5 1971 2
499.1 466.9 1971 3
501.5 469.3 1971 4
501.7 469.9 1971 5
502.4 470.9 1971 6
502.8 470.8 1971 7
503.2 472.6 1971 8
504.4 4752 1971 9
505.4 476,0 1971 10
507.6 477.4 1971 11






































The table presents levels for the augmented aggregate, M2+, as well as M2. M2÷
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1972 1 766.3 719.6 1975
1972 2 776.1 728.1 1975
1972 3 784.6 735.8 1975
1972 4 789.8 741.2 1975
1972 5 795.3 745.9 1975
1972 6 801.9 752.6 1975
1972 7 811.3 762.3 1975
1972 8 820.9 771.8 1975
1972 9 829.4 780.9 1975
1972 10 838.3 789.5 1975
1972 11 846.2 796.6 1975
1972 12 855.7 805.1 1975
1973 1 861.7 813.5 1976
1973 2 863.1 817.8 1976
1973 3 862.3 818.7 1976
1973 4 865.1 823.2 1976
1973 5 870.6 830.3 1976
1973 6 876.7 837.2 1976
1973 7 882.0 841.0 1976
1973 8 885.5 843.6 1976
1973 9 886.6 844.6 1976
1973 10 892.1 848.5 1976
1973 11 894.9 854.4 1976
1973 12 899.0 860.9 1976
1974 1 902.7 865.4 1977
1974 2 906.6 870.3 1977
1974 3 911.9 876.5 1977
1974 4 913.2 879.1 1977
1974 5 914.1 881.2 1977
1974 6 916.2 884.6 1977
1974 7 918.5 888.0 1977
1974 8 919.8 891.1 1977
1974 9 921.2 895.1 1977
1974 10 927.3 900.2 1977
1974 11 933.7 905.4 1977












































































































Month M2+ M2 Month M2+ M2 Month M2÷ M2
1981 1 1677.6 1640 1984 1 2278.5 2202.4 1987 1 3105.7 2836.8
1981 2 1689.8 1652 1984 2 2296.6 2221.2 1987 2 3121.6 2837
1981 3 1709.7 1670.8 1984 3 2311.4 2236.8 1987 3 3136.3 2841.4
1981 4 1730.5 1691.7 1984 4 2327.9 2252.8 1987 4 3152.7 2855.8
1981 5 1736.3 1697 1984 5 2341.4 2267.7 1987 5 3155.2 2860.7
1981 6 1745.4 1705.5 1984 6 2352.9 2279.8 1987 6 3159.6 2862.6
1981 7 1757.9 1718.7 1984 7 2364.7 2290.3 1987 7 3173.8 2868.8
1981 8 1773.1 1734.9 1984 8 2378.8 2299.9 1987 8 3195.2 2882.7
1981 9 1782 1745.8 1984 9 2399.7 2316.3 1987 9 3211.9 2898
1981 10 1797.1 1760.5 1984 10 2413.6 2328.7 1987 10 3207.4 2913.8
1981 II 1814.7 1776.8 1984 11 2438.1 2353.1 1987 ii 3189.5 2915.8
1981 12 1831.4 1793.3 1984 12 2464.1 2377.8 1987 12 3195.4 2920.1
1982 I 1850.3 1812,6 1985 1 2495.5 2403.5 1988 I 3223.4 2944.6
1982 2 1853.2 1815.9 1985 2 2524.4 2427.2 1988 2 3245 2963.3
1982 3 1865.4 1828.5 1985 3 2536.6 2438.7 1988 3 3262.3 2981.1
1982 4 1879.8 1842.6 1985 4 2541.8 2442.2 1988 4 3282.5 3003.7
1982 5 1892.2 1854.4 1985 5 2564.4 2457.8 1988 5 3299.4 3021.5
1982 6 1902.6 1865.3 1985 6 2597.9 2484.2 1988 6 3312.3 3033.9
1982 7 1914.4 1877.1 1985 7 2619.8 2500.4 1988 7 3319.9 3041.2
1982 8 1936.2 1895.8 1985 8 2643.1 2518 1988 8 3319.2 3044.6
1982 9 1954.2 1910.7 1985 9 2661.9 2533.3 1988 9 3325.7 3047.6
1982 10 1972.8 1926 1985 10 2678.9 2543.8 1988 10 3341.5 3056.9
1982 11 1988.7 1939.2 1985 Il 2702.6 2557.2 1988 11 3356.7 3073.6
1982 12 2004.3 1953.2 1985 12 2731.3 2575 1988 12 3363.5 3081.4
1983 1 2062.6 2009 1986 1 2744.3 2580 1989 1 3368.4 3085.5
1983 2 2103.9 2046.8 1986 2 2764.1 2590 1989 2 3365.6 3085.4
1983 3 2126.2 2066.1 1986 3 2798.2 2611.2 1989 3 3371.7 3093
1983 4 2146 2082.4 1986 4 2833.7 2637.6 1989 4 3380.3 3097.1
1983 5 2166.9 2099.6 1986 5 2868 2663.7 1989 5 3388.7 3099
1983 6 2181.4 2111.2 1986 6 2895.4 2684.5 1989 6 3409.5 3116.3
1983 7 2194.8 2123.6 1986 7 2926.6 2711.7 1989 7 3441.9 3143.4
1983 8 2203.1 2132.1 1986 8 2959 2734 1989 8 3466 3161.4
1983 9 2216.7 2144.2 1986 9 2987.4 2753.5 1989 9 3488.7 3178.9
1983 10 2238.9 2165.2 1986 10 3017.6 2777 1989 10 3509.5 3199
1983 11 2250.8 2177.1 1986 11 3043.6 2793 1989 11 3534.5 3218.9
1983 12 2263 2187.6 1986 12 3075.5 2818.2 1989 12 3561.9 3239.8











































































1993 1 4046.7 3502.8
2 4063.6 3494.2
3 4066.2 3494.8
4 4072.8 3498
5 4108.1 3521.9
6 4128.5 3528.7
7 4148.3 3533.7
8 4169.2 3536
9 4201.8 3544.2
10 4225.6 3547.8
11 4252.3 3560.1
12 4265.1 3567.6
1 4278.9 3572.8
2 4280 3568.9
3 4276.7 3582.9
4 4277.1 3589.9
5 4278 3590.9
6 4263.8 3581.3
1993
1993
1993
1993
1993
1993
1993
1993
1993
1993
1993
1994
1994
1994
1994
1994
1994
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